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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
1;1.11

11111

11 1_,JPflf.fT, KEITH GURR
'.1ii\H Pi\NCH LANDS, a

µart.nerc,r11 p,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. 19225

vs

LEE A. FITZGERALD, HELEN
,-J f ZGERALD, his wife,
i'ERRY G. FITZGERALD and
1:AROLYN FITZGERALD, his wife,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF CASE
Except for two corrections the Nature of the Case is set forth
i\ppellants' statement.

yy

The first is that the contract involving the

respondents Fitzgeralds was dated March, 1978, not February, 1978.

Also

issue of slander of title was not litigated in this case and can not

the

hereafter be litigated because that issue is now res judicata as a result
of the dismissal of Appellants' prior appeal of the judgment of the lower
1.oi1rl as to these respondents in Case No. 18529 dated November 1, 1982.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
1

,,,

1

11·• this Court dismissed with prejudice Appellants' prior appeal

11 LhPse respondents, the trial court amended, corrected, and clarified

'' • judyments, pursuant to Rule 60(a).

Its judgment as to these respondents

is dated May 17, 1981, an•i

the

i111PnrlmP•1 1

r1n\1f 1 1·tt:11

convey certain propert 1 rece1 ·;eu hi a1•1,el I Jn le
the March, 1978, contract
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1own payment on

by thPm prior tn trial which resulte

in the May 17, 1982, judgment I into' money judgment since appellants
were not able to comply with that order.

It also corrected the oversigr

of a $48,500 mortgage so as to allow judgment to these respondents for
only the net amount since only such net 1vas received by appellants,

It

also adjusted the value of the property received by these respondents
to market value rather than contract value ($240 per acre rather than
$320 as per the contract),

The lower court reaffirmed its position that

"fhe decision should be and is based upon the equitable principle of
L11just enrichment." ( R 930)
RELIEF SQU[HT ON APPEAL
Appel 1ants state they "seek revers a 1 of the judgment on the Februar.
78 Contract" despite the fact that such judgment was appealed from in
Case No. 18529 and that appeal was dismissed with prejudice on November
l, 1981 (see Supreme Court motion file in that case).
Respondents' position as to the claimed relief based on slander of
title is set forth under Nature of Case and is hereby incorporated by
reference.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AS TO PERRY G. AND CAROLYN FITZGERALD
Appell ants' statement ot the facts is f Ia vied because ( 1) it makes
attempt to limit the facts to the proper scope of this appeal; (2) it
does not canvas those facts in the l qht most favorable to the prevail
party; (3) it does not cite the record as to vihere those facts are to:found.
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rJte

e:ntry

fJc".:s are as fo11ows:
•Jf

the Judgment of May 17, 1982, Appellants did not

these 'Jespondents the property they were ordered to convey because

'ri

.01

th~;

1

1 that property prior to that judgment.

1

(R 930)

The difference in value between what Appellants received as a down

payment (an apartment house and other property having a value of $125,000
but encumbered by a $48,500 mortgage) and what Respondents received (60 acres
unimproved land worth 5240 per acre) was $62,100.

rif

(R 931, 932)

There were expert opinions that the value of the property received
by Appellants was more ($203,000 according to Respondents' expert).
4.

No evidence concerning slander of title was offered or received by

the luwer court after Case No. 18529 was dismissed with prejudice.
ARGUMENT
THE APPELLANTS SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED A JUDGMENT FOR DAMAGES
AGAINST RESPONDENT PERRY FITZGERALD FOR SLANDER OF TITLE AS
SUCH ISSUE ~AS NOT LITIGATED IN THE LOWER COURT AND IS NOT
REVIEWABLE BY THIS COURT.
Under Argument in Appellants' brief only their Point VII (No. 7 in
Table of Contents is not the same) is directed at these Respondents and
it 1s

not the same as set forth above.
PPspondents will deal with them in the order in which they appear in

the brief, i e., No. 7, l, then Vil.
,1J
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tile ')tacement of Facts (P
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As to No. 7, it is significant that

25-29) the term "slander of title" does

a I I and none of tre facts there stated relate to it.

The

unly place other than in the table of contents where that term appears
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is in (l) the Relief sou<Jht 'in
authority is there cited
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38 under- "Point

where no issue is posed and thP notice (eferred to is based on the contract Respondents had with Leland Fitzy<=rald, not Appellants.
As to l {P. 36), the Appellants set up a "otraw man" and knock it
down, to wit:

Respondents' rights under the i'larch 1978 contract.

Respondents never claimed at trial that they had any.

They abandoned

that contract after it became clear to them that they would not acquire
any title thereunder since Appellants could only convey title to them by
performing on their underlying contract to Leland Fitzgerald and wife as
the latter held the title and contended (correctly the lower court found
that Appell ants were in default on that contract.

The trial court

did~:

grant relief to Respondents based on that contract but to the contrary
concluded that the March 78 contract had not been performed by either pa·
that performances of each party were concurrent conditions which had not
been fulfilled (hence in effect rescinded by abandonment by both parties
The only issue was whEther the payments made would be forfeited or be
subject to restitution.

In view of the vast disparity in values receive

the lower court properly ordered restitution (in kind initially, in mane
subsequently) to prevent unjust enrichment.

( R 930)

As to Vil, it's not clear how it is related to
Page 36 but in any event all that was said as to
in response to it and hence will not be repeated.

~~o

'o'ihich preceeds it
7 above is applica:
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"'l'C'l ldnts cite tV10 cases in support of their position.
~.e

is in µoint.

In Strand v. Mayne, 14 Utah 2d

Neither

355 (1963), this

urnrt •iranted summary judgment in favor of a seller of real estate who
V1as sued by the buyer after the buyer had resold and the initial seller
had repossessed upon default by the subsequent buyer and also the initial
buyer.

The basic claim V1as one of recovering payments made to avoid an

unconscionable forfeiture.

The case is clearly distinguishable on two

grounds:

l)

The buyer there was admittedly in default and the seller

was not.

In our case the tri a 1 court found that "neither party made a

conditional tender of the performance required on September 6, 1978,
sufficient to place the other party in breach of contract" (R 756,
Finding of Fact No. 8), hence neither party was in default.

2)

was no disparity in considerations exchanged in the Strand case.

There
In

tact this Court there found that the buyers received"$l ,699.00 more than
they have paid" (P. 357).

In this case the disparity was $62,100 (R 932).

Hence that case is no precedent for relief on appeal and in any event such
an argument should have been made in Case No. 18529, not in this one.
The second case referrred to above was that of Corporation Nine v.
I~ylor,

30 Utah 2d

47 (1973).

There the lower court found for the sellers

dnd the trial court was not required to find an estoppel under the facts there
(here such an issue V1as not even raised) stating "This court on review will
rint

overturn his determination and compel such a finding unless the evidence

, lc·J1l1 preponderates to the contrary" (R 52).

Here the evidence does not

"c !early preponderate to the contrary" and in any event the time for such

- f,

a finding on the issue of breach of

contr~ct wa~

when that issue Nas

before this court (or potentially so since no brief was ever filed) on
the basis of the May 1982 judgment rather than

that of the judgment

of April 19, 1983, which did not deal with the issue of breach but only
with the sum to be awarded Respondents to avoid unjust enrichment.
CDNCLUS ION

There is no merit to any points raised by Appellants in their
brief.

Most

importantly~

of the issues raised therein are a

matter of res judicata due to the dismissal of Case No. 18529 on
November l, 1982.

The only proper function of this appellate court as

to the proceedings subsequent to that data would be to correct the

lower court if its determination of value necessary to convert a propert;
award into a money judgment was not supported

PY

substantial evidence.

Appellants do not even contend that the valuation fixed by the lower
court did not find such support in the evidence and had they raised the
issue it would not have been effective since the valuation was within
the range of the experts' opinions and in fact was closer to Appellants'
expert than 1D Respondents' expert.
Dated this 12th

day of September, 1983.

;Q~~B U~

Robert B. Hansen
Attorney for Respondents
Perry G. anc Carolyn Fi tzgera

